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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
as they did in part by pouring it out, to drink, to sell, to give away
or throw away?' 7 7 As long as there is the intent to deprive the
owner of the goods, it matters little what the motive or reason for
the theft be.
J. S. M.
PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL IN WEST VIRGINIA
Ever a shock to the conscience of the newly-fledged law student
engaged in a perusal of Professor Williston's Cases on Contracts is
the decision rendered in Kirksey v. Kirksey.1 Defendant Kirksey
promised his widowed sister-in-law, Antillico, that he would pro-
vide a home for her and her family. Antillico, relying upon the
defendant's promise gave up government land on which she had
been living and traveling some sixty miles established a home upon
the land so generously proffered by the defendant. At the end of
two years defendant Kirksey ordered Antillico to move off the
land.
Under the strict common law consideration requirements, as
pointed out by the court in the above case, defendant Kirksey's
promise would not be binding and could be repudiated at will.
Since there had been no "bargained-for-exchange",' but only a
promise to bestow a mere gratuity, "sister Antillico", who had
relied upon the promise to her detriment, was without a remedy.
To avoid the harsh results and patent injustice compelled by
a strict adherence to the doctrine of consideration in the Kirksey
case and in similar cases the common law has in part effected an
internal reorganization. One expression of this remedial tendency
is found in the Restatement of Contracts:
"A promise which the promisor should reasonably ex-
pect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and sub-
stantial character on the part of the promisee and which does
induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can
be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.' 3
It is to be noted that "promissory estoppel", as this curative
doctrine is generally termed, applies only to promises; it does not
57 The dissenting judge argued that lucri cause is the civil law epuivalent to
the common law animus furandi, and points out that it has been accepted by
several courts as a part of the common law, and that there can be no larceny
unless some benefit was expected by the taker.
1 8 Ala. 131 (1845).
2 This term is the essence of 'Williston's explanation of consideration. See
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1927) §§ 100, 102 et seq.
3 1 RESTATEMENT, CONRACTS (1932) § 90.
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give relief for detriment suffered preparatory to the acceptance of
an ofler.4  Likewise, promissory estoppel differs from "true"
estoppel in that the former looks to promises contemplating fu-
ture action or forbearance, while the latter is directed only to
representations concerning an existing state of facts.
Some courts have frowned upon the whole doctrine of promis-
sory estoppel as an unwarranted derogation of the time-honored
rules of consideration.5 Other courts have boldly cited and applied
the tenet stated in the Restatement." Still other courts, while not
giving express recognition to promissory estoppel, have adopted
the spirit and achieved the results flowing therefrom by resorting
to such labels as "estoppel ",7 or by laboring to work out a contract
with consideration when in fact "bargained for exchange" was
not contemplated." In these last jurisdictions the reasoning is mo-
tivated by the same stimuli from which promissory estoppel pro..
ceeds - a promise with reasonable reliance thereon to the detriment
of the promisee with injustice inevitably being perpetrated if the
promise should not be enforced.
In no West Virginia case has the decision been placed square-
ly on the basis of promissory estoppel. The spirit of the doctrine
runs through a whole line of cases in which relief has been granted
pursuant to the reasoning proper to promissory estoppel. For the
sake of convenience these West Virginia cases have been divided
and discussed under three headings: (1) parol gifts of land fol-
lowed by improvements; (2) promises of other benefits inducing
action or forbearance; (3) promises not to plead statutory de-
fenses.
1. Parol Gift of Land FoZlowed By Improvements. A, de-
sirous of starting P in life, proposed to him that if he would go
on a certain tract, cultivate and improve it, he would convey the
land to him. Relying upon this promise, P entered and made valu-
able improvements. Meanwhile, A conveyed to B. P sued for
specific performance.9
4 Distinction clearly drawn by Judge Hand in Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros.,
64 F. (2d) 344 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933).
5 Bibb v. Freeman, 59 Ala. 612 (1877) ; Beall v. Clark, 71 Ga. 818 (1883);
Smith v. Force, 31 Minn. 119, 16 N. W. 704 (1883).
6 Switzer v. Gertenbach, 122 I. App. 26 (1905); Ricketts v. Scothorn, 57
Neb. 51, 77 N. W. 365 (1898).
7 Beatty v. Western College, 177 Ill: 280, 52 N. E. 432 (1898); Switzer v.
Gertenbach, 122 Ill. App. 26 (1905).
s Deveemon v. Shaw, 69 Md. 199, 14 Atl. 464 (1888).
9 Frame v. Frame, 32 W. Va. 463, 9 S. E. 901 (1889). Specific performance,
though, was denied because of laches.
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The gift alone, when followed by no improvements, could not
be enforced for it was at best a mere gratuity, and the courts held
that the Statute of Frauds and the doctrine of consideration pre-
sented effective bars.10 In many of these cases, though, the donee,
reasonably relying upon the promised gift, had entered on the
land and expended money and labor in improvements. Courts of
law, faced on one hand with the injustice resulting from this rea-
sonable reliance upon the promised gift if it were not enforced,
and on the other hand by the doctrine of consideration and the
Statute of Frauds, were unable to find a just solution to the prob-
lem.
Courts of equity being less hampered by these restrictive in-
fluences first found a substitute for the missing consideration in
the doctrine of "meritorious consideration"," but as its limitations
were inherent, it was of value in only a small number of cases. In
those situations where the donee relying upon the promise made
valuable improvements, a more satisfactory solution was found.
Specific performance of a promise to give the land in such case has
generally been granted on the basis of the "rule" that "parol
gifts of land followed by improvements" will be enforced."2 This
doctrine performed the two-fold service of taking the cases out of
the Statute of Frauds,3 and of providing an adequate substitute
for the missing considerdtion. 14
If, instead of being a promise of a gift, it were a verbal con-
tract of sale, the Statute of Frauds apparently denied all relief.
10 White v. White, 64 W. Va. 30, 60 S. E. 885 (1908).
11 Marling v. Marling, 9 W. Va. 79 (1876).
12 Our court, though, has been properly wary of holding that any acts per-
formed would be sufficient, and has set up strict requirements regarding the
nature and extent of improvements that must be made. Frame v. Frame, 32
W. Va. 463, 9 S. E. 901 (1889); Harrison v. Harrison, 36 W. Va. 556, 15 S.
E. 87 (1892); Grim v. England, 46 W. Va. 480, 33 S. E. 310 (1889); Spurgin
v. Spurgin, 47 W. Va. 38. 34 S. E. 750 (1899); Stone v. Hill, 52 W. Va. 63,
43 S. B. 92 (1902); Meadows v. Meadows, 60 W. Va. 34, 53 S. E. 718 (1906);
Short v. Patton, 79 W. ra. 179, 90 S. E. 598 (1916) ; Berry v. Berry, 83 W. Va.
763, 99 S. E. 79 (1919) ; Moss v. Moss, 88 W. Va. 135, 106 S. E. 429 (1921) ;
Bright v. Channels, 92 W. Va. 93, 114 S. E. 513 (1922) ; Farrar v. Goodwin, 98
"t* Va. 215, 126 S. E. 922 (1925) ; Sponaugle v. Warner, 98 W. Va. 532, 127
S. E. 403 (1925).
'3 Lorentz v. Lorentz, 14 W. Va. 761 (3879). Courts of equity have taken
these cases out of the Statute of Frauds for fear that a strict compliance
would result in fraud.
14 Courts of equity have held that sufficient consideration is present for
fear of working an injustice. They hold that whereas in a contract with val-
uable consideration, mere delivery of actual possession would be sufficient part
performance, in a gift there must be present that which takes the place of a
valuable consideration, and the substitute for it is found in the expenditure of
money or labor on valuable improvements,
3
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But, if in accordance with the agreement, a change of possession
had taken place, the vendee would partly have performed his con-
tract and it would be fraud on the part of the vendor if he were
allowed to divest the vendee of possession. A strict application of
the Statute of Frauds would result in fraud, and, courts of equity
looking to the substance and not to the form of the matter were
not willing to let this happen. If the change of possession were
accompanied by the expenditure of money or labor on the land,
all the powers of equity were called into action, for not only would
there be frazd by the vendor, from which he would be allowed to
profit, but the vendee by his actions had introduced valuable con-
sideration into the transaction. When a donee takes possession
and expends money or labor, as against the donor he stands on the
same footing as a purchaser for valuable consideration, and the
Statute of Frauds has no application 5 -the litigation revolving
around whether or not the reasonable reliance of the donee is suf-
ficient to supply the missing consideration.
In those cases where a parol promise to convey land is en-
forced by reason of a change of possession followed by improve.
ments, the court says that the Statute of Frauds has no application
after such a change of position has taken place0 - necessarily im-
plying that the Statute would apply in the absence of these special
circumstances.1 " The question arises whether "contract", as pre-
scribed by the statute, 8 contemplated the inclusion of "gift" where
no consideration of an orthodox nature is present. The Virginia
court has taken the position that the Statute of Frauds does not
extend to gifts of land."9 Since frauds might be perpetrated as
readily in the enforcement of parol promises to give land as in
alleged parol agreements to convey, the reason for the Statute of
Frauds is present to an equal degree in both cases.
It is interesting to note that in discussing these cases, the
court does not mention the doctrine of promissory estoppel, but
that these cases fit into the rule is obvious. A promise has been
made which the promisor could reasonably have foreseen would in-
duce the action that was induced, and there would be inustice if
15 Frane v. Frame, 32 W. Va. 463, 9 S. E. 901 (1889).
16 White v. White, 64 W. Va. 30, 60 S. E. 885 (1908); Miller v. Lorentz,
39 W. Va. 160, 19 S. E. 391 (1894).
'7 Note (1930) 37 W. VA. L. Q. 288, 290.
18 . VA. CoDs (Michie, 1937) c. 36, art. 1, § 3: "1No contract for the sale
of land, or the lease thereof for more than one year, shall be enforceable unless
the contract or some note or memorandum thereof be in writing .... "
'9 Halsey v. Peters, Ex'r, 79 Va. 60, 69 (1884). Also see Pound, Considera-
tion in Equity (1918) 13 ILL. L. Rsv. 667, 672, 674.
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the promise were not enforced. That the difference between the
enforcement here and promissory estoppel is largely a matter of
terminology is amply illustrated by a comparison with similar situ-
ations in other states where the doctrine of promissory estoppel is
applied.20
2. Promises of Other Benefits Inducing Acts or Forbearance.
A promises P a gift of money, and to further evidence his intent
gives to P a promissory note, no consideration for the note being
present. P reasonably relying on the promised gift, enters into
other negotiations or incurs debts.21
That the element, in such a case, that makes the promise en-
forceable is the action taken in reliance on it is well evidenced by
a comparison of cases where relief is denied when no change of
position has occurred,2 2 and those where it is granted when the
promisee has altered his position or forborne to alter it because of
his reliance on the promise.23  The language of the court, while still
utterly devoid of a direct or indirect reference to the doctrine of
promissory estoppel, is indicative of its motivation.
An interesting deviation from the general trend is found in
cases of gratuitous licenses in land which, though action is induced,
are held to be revocable. These cases are decided with apparent re-
luctance by the court. It will be noticed that the decision in such
a case is based upon the lack of a deed in conveying the interest.24
Why the necessity of a deed should be so strenuously adhered to
in these cases, and not in cases of a gift of land, is not clear. It
can only be noted that this distinction exists.
3. Promises Not to Plead Statutory Defenses. P has fire in-
surance with D. The policy states that no suit can be sustained un-
less commenced within six months after the fire. P relying upon
the promise of D to pay the full sum of the policy without suit if
B will also pay does not sue within the six months. Later P, re-
covering from B, sues D who has refused to pay. D sets up the
statutory period as a defense.25
In this and similar eases2 6 a valid consideration is.found to be
20 Greiner v. Greiner, 131 Kan. 760, 293 Pac. 759 (1930). The Kansas
court quotes RESTATEufENT, CONTRACTS § 90.
21McKiinney v. Rhinehart, 102 W. Va. 531, 135 S. E. 654 (1926).
22 Banner Window Glass Co. v. Barriat, 85 W. Va. 750, 102 S. E. 726 (1920).
23 Huff v. Lanes Bottom Bank, 110 W. Va. 389, 158 S. E. 380 (1931).
24 Pifer v. Brown, 43 W. Va. 412, 27 S. E. 399 (1897). See also Comment
(1940) 46 W. VA. L. Q. 263.
25Galloway v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 45 W. Va. 357, 31 S. E. 969 (1898).
20 Sadler v. Marsden, 160 Va. 392, 168 S. E. 357 (1933) ; Georgeton v. Rey-
nolds, 161 Va. 164, 170 S. E. 741 (1933).
5
N. and A.: Promissory Estoppel in West Virginia
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1940
STUDENT NOTES
present in the making of the original contract, but the litigation re-
volves around the later promise not to plead a statutory bar - a
representation of future action, upon which representation tht,
promisee reasonably relies, greatly to his detriment if the promise
is not enforced. The cases frequently hold that the promisor has
by his actions waived his right, and that since he no longer has it,
he can not later attempt to plead it. Others, though, speak more
in terms of estoppel.
But regardless of whether the language used is indicative of
waiver or estoppel, the stimulus which compels enforcement of the
agreement is the unfairness that would result to the promisee who
reasonably relied upon a promise not to do an act in the future. It
is only in cases in which unfairness would result that it would seem
just to compel a fulfillment of the promise, and it is precisely in
these cases that the doctrine of promissory estoppel would be ap-
plicable.
Conchsion. The courts in West Virginia, in arriving at their
decision in cases where no actual consideration is present, but re-
liance has taken place, often do so on the basis of well-established
"rules" of law or equity. In other cases, their decision is based
solely upon the inequity of allowing the promisor to escape his
promise after action has been induced. The doctrine of promissory
estoppel is not mentioned by name, but its application in such
cases would result in no different conclusion. The doctrine itself
is not new, it is an entity, gathering into its sphere diversified
rulings and tenets of the law. It may not be officially law in West
Virginia, but its influence is both apparent and desirable, and its
adoption inevitable.
W. E. N.
A. A. A.
TRUST INVESTMENTS IN WEST VIRGINIA
Today, the problem of the proper investment of trust funds
by fiduciaries arises with much more frequency than formerly.
That it is becoming increasingly important is evidenced by the
amount of recent legislation dealing with the question. The prob-
lem is troublesome both to legislatures and to courts in their attempts
to formulate principles which will, as far as possible, not only keep
intact the principal of the trust fund, and at the same time secure
6
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